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Performance as Philosophy: Responding to the
Problem of ‘Application’
laura cull
This article begins from the premise that a ‘critical turning point’ has been reached in terms of the
relationship between performance and philosophy. Theatre and performance scholars are becoming
increasingly engaged in philosophical discourse and there are growing amounts of work that take
philosophy – from the work of Plato to Heidegger and Deleuze – as their guiding methodology for
performance analysis. However, this article argues that we need to go further in questioning how we use
philosophy in relation to performance, and that theatre and performance scholarship should attempt
to go beyond merely applying philosophical concepts to performance ‘examples’. One way to do this,
the article suggests, is by questioning the very distinction between performance and philosophy, for
instance by exploring the idea of performance as philosophy. The article concludes by drawing from
the work of figures such as Allan Kaprow, Henri Bergson, Franc¸ois Laruelle and John Mullarkey to
argue that philosophers and performance scholars alike might extend their conception of what counts
as thinking to include not only activities like performance, but embodied experiences and material
processes of all kinds.
What is the relationship between performance and philosophy? What is it about the
contemporary context that seems to make the question of this relationship so urgent,
interesting or attractive to so many in the field of theatre and performance studies
now? Why, in other words, might the question of philosophy appear in this issue of
Theatre Research International concerned with ‘critical turning points’ in theatre and
performance scholarship? Of course, in the space of this article, I will not be able to
answer any of these questions in anything but a highly partial, incomplete and, no
doubt, personal way. And yet a sense of the need to evaluate the current state and
potential futures of the field of theatre and performance studies demands that they be
asked and that an answer be attempted. In order to continue to cultivate the emerging
subfield of performance and philosophy, I would argue that we need to ask ourselves
what it is that we want from philosophy, and, furthermore, to examine what philosophy
brings to those who engage with it in relation to performance.
By way of introduction, it is perhaps worth relating that my own engagement
with philosophy did originate, somewhat reactively, in a kind of dissatisfaction with the
available discourses for explaining how the arts worked and why they mattered. That
is, I came to value philosophy as a discourse that allowed me, in turn, to value the
seemingly ineffable or even superficial or ‘meaningless’ aspects of performance practice
(from the point of view of linguistically, semiotically, representationally focused modes
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of analysis), insofar as these aspects could be understood differently, via philosophy, as
art’s affective presence and material force. As such, I might begin by suggesting that what
we need to return to or revisit is less philosophy per se, but specific philosophies insofar
as they allow us to rehabilitate the very categories that were so thoroughly deconstructed
in the last ‘theory explosion’:1 ‘presence’, ‘the body’, ‘the voice’, ‘community’ and so
forth. For instance, philosophies like those of Gilles Deleuze and Henri Bergson seem
to provide a sound conceptual basis from which to argue that the ephemeral, material
work of performance does not need an interpreting, anthropocentric subject standing
outside it in order for it to have ‘meaning’. Rather, we can activate these materialist
philosophies in order to rethink ‘meaning’ itself, in terms of affect and becoming, or
as a transformation of the audience that takes place on the level of the body through
participation. Furthermore, as I will go on to discuss in what follows, these philosophies
provide us with the resources to rethink performance itself as a kind of philosophy, and
indeed to reconceive what counts as philosophy.2
Before I develop and explore the stakes of this claim, I want to begin by addressing
one of the main problems that seems to have troubled the relationship between
performance and philosophy; that is, the tendency of both sides merely to apply
philosophy to performance. Second, I will briefly compare two accounts of the experience
of ‘waiting’ – one that comes from the French philosopher Henri Bergson and one that
comes from the American artist Allan Kaprow – in order to suggest an alternative to
application, but also to emphasize the indeterminate nature of the distinction between
the activities that we call ‘performance’ and ‘philosophy’. Finally, I return to this tentative
proposition that the rare marriage3 between performance and philosophy is at its richest
and most egalitarian if philosophy is willing to encounter performance as thinking, and
as that which might extend what philosophy counts as thinking – a discussion that will
also lead us to question the implications of the provocative idea that everything (not just
subjects or minds) thinks. But first: application.
Problems in ‘a rare marriage’: on application
Although, etymologically, ‘apply’ comes from the Latin applicare, which simply means
‘bring things in contact with one another’, the notion of ‘application’ in terms of
scholarship has come to connote a kind of methodological hylomorphism, in which
a fixed idea is superimposed upon a pliant example, a predetermined theory over a
passive practice. Application implies the subordination of the powers of one practice or
process to the needs and goals of another, the instrumentalization of the example for the
purposes of an argument which has little interest in the example itself beyond its value
for that argument.
In the light of such connotations, interdisciplinary scholars in general (myself
included) are often at pains to insist that what they are doing does not involve the ‘mere
application’ of ideas taken from one discipline to another, or from theory into practice.
Nevertheless, David Saltz argues that performance theorists
typically apply theories by scholars in other disciplines such as philosophy . . . If
someone we respect has published a theoretical assertion that sounds good and supports
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our own position, we uncritically adopt and apply the assertion . . . Because performance
theory very rarely advances original arguments in support of the philosophical
principles it adopts . . . we are often merely theoretical parasites.4
Even if we were to wish to temper Saltz’s characterization of the parasitic nature
of performance studies, it does seem fair to note the extent to which performance
theorists’ encounters with philosophy tend to be coloured by the pursuit of ‘method’; we
often look to philosophy for the next new method (to Deleuze, to Badiou, to Quentin
Meillassoux) with which to analyse performance, as if all philosophy could be condensed
to a singular and coherent methodology. And that is before we have even considered the
problematic (as well as productive) implications of transplanting such a method from
the philosophical environment in which it was cultivated into the unfamiliar territory of
performance. Prominent scholars have warned against such an approach with regard to
Deleuze. For instance, Claire Colebrook suggests,
There is a problem with talking about ‘method’ in Deleuze, simply because his whole
approach to life and thinking set itself against any idea that we should approach
problems with ready-made schemas, questions or systems . . . Philosophy, especially,
ought to be creative and responsive, forming its questions through what it encounters
. . . If Deleuze has a method it is that we should never have a method, but should allow
ourselves to become in relation to what we are seeking to understand.5
Of course, the problem of application also pertains to philosophers, who are arguably
not averse to being parasitic on the arts. For Martha Nussbaum, for instance, it is all
too often that art is ‘simply being used as a primer for Philosophy 101’.6 Similarly, in his
2006 book Filmosophy, Daniel Frampton notes the way in which philosophy might use
film, particularly as part of its pedagogy, but only insofar as films are seen as containing
‘stories and characterisations that helpfully illustrate well-known philosophical ideas’,
rather than looking to the presentation of ideas by the cinematic form itself.7 This is
what Frampton calls ‘film “plus” philosophy’, a mode of relation which he criticizes both
for its condescending stance and for its failure to actually tell us something about film
(as well as about philosophy).8 Practitioners are positioned as needing to learn from
philosophers here, rather than as equal contributors to a two-way flow of ideas, albeit
they can also be backhandedly praised when they get a philosophical idea ‘right’ (that is,
when they illustrate it effectively).
Likewise, philosophers have often framed theatre as in need of the philosopher in
order for the ideas embedded within it to be fully articulated. This question of ‘need’ also
figures strongly in both Derrida and Adorno’s response to Beckett’s work as that which
both resists and demands philosophical interpretation; or further, it is the very resistance
of Beckett’s work to philosophy that seems to demand philosophizing. As Richard J. Lane
has helpfully summarized,
This paradox would simply disappear if the critic believed that the work of philosophy
could completely account for the artwork, or, if the critic decided that the artwork was
not in need of interpretation: perhaps it is non-conceptual, or, perhaps it always already
communicates what it wants to say, but in a language entirely other to philosophy.9
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To go beyond application, then, we might suggest, the philosopher or
philosophically minded performance theorists’ study of a given play or performance
must allow new ideas to be created, ideas that the thinker has not already developed on
the basis of some other encounter. We have to be convinced that theatre and performance
are doing something for the thinking and to the thinker; that it is through theatre, and
indeed through this particular aspect of theatre alone, that this thought has emerged.
Correlatively, performance practice might be seen to avoid application when it conceives
itself as a way of thinking rather than as the mere demonstration of existing ideas.
Allan Kaprow, for instance, saw little value in generating artworks that ‘remain only
an illustration of a thought’ rather than providing participants with what he called an
‘experienced insight’10: an event of embodied thinking by the participant in the act
of doing, which is not the same as the recognition of some underlying metaphorical
meaning of the work determined in advance by the artist. To make performances that
stage what we already know is not a valuable activity, for Kaprow, in contrast to creating
the conditions for experiments the results of which remain unknown.
If one of the problems of application is that the concept or theory applied remains
rigidly unaltered or insensitively untouched by the singularity of that to which it is
applied, then the aim of conjoining performance and philosophy might, by contrast,
aspire to generate new ideas of both on the basis of a mutually transformative encounter, or
what Isabelle Stengers calls ‘reciprocal capture’: ‘a dual process of identity construction’.11
We do not yet know what performance or philosophy can do. Therefore, perhaps, we
cannot and should not try to answer the question ‘what is philosophy?’ or ‘what is
performance?’ because to provide an answer ‘would presuppose the possibility of a
judgment about what a philosopher . . . can become’, what a theatre-maker can become.12
Bergson the artist, Kaprow the philosopher
Allow me to develop an example. In the collection of texts that make up Bergson’s last
published work, The Creative Mind, a provocative tension is set up between the powers
of philosophy and the powers of art in relation to Bergson’s overall project to bring
perception closer to the reality of indivisible change. On the one hand, we might note
that Bergson puts forward a metaphysically privileged idea of the artist – as one who
sees the world in a direct, rather than utilitarian, fashion.13 Ordinarily, Bergson suggests,
the faculties of perception and action are attached to one another with the result that
perception tends ‘to turn away from what it has a material interest in not seeing’.14 ‘Life
demands that we put on blinders’, Bergson argues, and, as such, philosophy should allow
itself to be inspired by the artist, who can ‘lead us to a completer perception of reality
by means of a certain displacement of our attention’ away from the merely useful.15
On the other hand, though, despite this privileging of the artist, it is often philosophy
rather than art that Bergson credits with the power to reveal the indivisibility of past
and present; it is through philosophy that our perception is ultimately mobilized and
revivified. Art merely ‘enriches our present’, Bergson argues in The Creative Mind, ‘but
it scarcely enables us to go beyond it’ in order to witness the fundamental change that
constitutes metaphysical reality.16
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In contrast, I would suggest that we challenge the very notion of philosophy and
art as distinct activities, or, put differently, that we expand our understandings of the
forms and kinds of activity that might count as philosophy or art. In part, the resources
to do this come from Bergson himself, for instance in the famous example – cited by
Deleuze in Bergsonism – of the one who must wait for the sugar to melt in a glass of
water. Bergson says,
If I want to mix a glass of sugar and water, I must, willy-nilly, wait until the sugar
melts. This little fact is big with meaning. For here the time I have to wait is not . . .
mathematical time. [Rather] It coincides with my impatience, that is to say, with a
certain portion of my own duration, which I cannot protract or contract as I like. It is
no longer something thought, it is something lived.17
Philosophy here is equated with the perception of duration, as that which might take
place through an embodied experience of waiting; that is, through what was then a
relatively ordinary action, available to all.
And I want to suggest that this revelatory yet democratic nature of waiting for
the sugar to melt resonates with the participatory works that Kaprow referred to as his
‘Activities’ rather than ‘Happenings’. That is, if Bergson wants to frame the event of
waiting for the sugar to melt as a philosophical activity, Kaprow’s practice provides us
with the resources to understand it as an aesthetic activity (or, correlatively, for us to
understand Bergson’s example as art). For instance, here is the score or instructions for
an Activity by Kaprow called Level from 1970:
placing a block of ice and bale of straw
near each other somewhere
ice melting slowly
reducing bale, straw by straw
(keeping pace with the ice)
until nothing remains.18
While art historian Annette Leddy has interpreted this work biographically and
metaphorically,19 I would argue that what matters about Level is what happens to us
as participants as we reduce the bale straw by straw, trying to match our own rhythm
of action with that of the ice as it perceives the heat of the sun. Might such an example
be considered performance as philosophy, or philosophy as performance, within an
experiment where what distinguishes both terms from each other, and indeed from
other terms such as ‘experience’ or simply ‘life’, remains creatively undetermined? Or,
further, is it that all experience, all material encounters, are already thoughtful, and that
the activities that we are accustomed to referring to as ‘performance’ and ‘philosophy’
simply allow us to attend to the kinds of thinking that matter enacts on its own
terms?
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Concluding thoughts
For some, though, to say that performance is philosophy (or experience is thinking)
risks rendering ‘philosophy’ a term that means everything and nothing; it is to dissolve
the identity of philosophy altogether. As John Mullarkey has described, although the
‘extension, or diffusion, of philosophy into other fields has always been there in the
various “philosophies of” – “of history”, “of science”, “of art”, and so on, from its very
beginning’,20 the contemporary acceleration of this phenomenon has begun to cause
some anxiety:
What worries some philosophers, moreover, is that this process of diffusion is
proliferating at an alarming rate in what is an apparent philosophization of everything,
one that threatens to leave philosophy nowhere precisely because it is everywhere.
Philosophy will have lost its own identity.21
But is there more at stake in such concerns than a kind of disciplinary territorialism
on the one hand – the triggering of some self-protective mechanism in the face of an
imaginary imperial takeover by the non-discipline of philosophy – and on the other
a fear on the part of philosophers that ‘proper philosophy’ might become extinct in
a generalized post-disciplinary academy? Surely, as Franc¸ois Laruelle has suggested,
the project is not ‘to think without philosophy but to think without the authority of
philosophy’, to challenge philosophy’s right to determine who or what thinks or does
not think, where and when thinking is going on and when it is not.22 That is, it may
well be the very engagement with (non-)philosophies like Laruelle’s that encourages
us to move away from the application of the theoretical models we already possess and
towards an embodied encounter with the resistant materiality of performance’s thinking:
its embodied-thinking, participatory-thinking, or durational-thinking – encounters that
generate new ideas of what thought is and where, when and how it occurs.
Existing discourse emerging from the field of practice-as-research has already
gone some way to explore the nature of performance’s kind of thinking, taking a
particular and strategically necessary interest in how performance practice produces
new knowledge. But the production of knowledge is arguably only one definition of
thinking, or specifically of ‘research’, to which we might add many others; indeed, rather
than applying this definition of thinking to practice (as if it were the same as text-based
research), perhaps we might also look to performance itself to produce new ideas of
what thinking is. As I noted at the start of this article, a limit point of the argument
I am making might invite us to conclude that there are as many ways of thinking as
there are different activities or processes, or, further, to conclude that everything thinks.
That is, we might conclude that thinking is going on not only in performance (and
certainly not only in performance because it tends to involve human bodies), but in
all things (and therefore in all human, but also non-human, aspects of performance).
Indeed Mullarkey has already proposed as much, arguing, ‘We should no longer think
of thought as something representing passive things, but rather as something that things
do themselves alongside us’.23 ‘My’ body, for example, is doing its own kind of thinking
alongside ‘me’ as I work in the studio. The ice is thinking in its own way in response
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to the heat of the palm of my hand, of the sun. The stakes of this claim seem too great
to try and unfold here. I can only conclude by proposing that they will involve the
ethical: a demand to consider what new responsibilities we might have – as practitioners,
academics, audience members, humans – in relation to all these thinking things.
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